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When Can a
Nonrecourse Lender
Reach the Personal Assets
of Its Borrower?
Gregory M. Stein
A nonrecourse loan actually is a loan with limited recourse.
Defining these limits with precision is critically important
in avoiding unpleasant surprises-and litigation.

IN A NONRECOURSE LOAN, the lender
agrees to seek satisfaction solely from the mortgaged property and not from the borrower or
any of its equity holders personally The lender
presumably receives some sort of consideration
for its relinquishment of this important remedy,
and it would be unfair for a court later to award
the lender a personal judgment against the borrower solely because the foreclosure sale proceeds were insufficient to satisfy the debt.

Because the nonrecourse lender cannot reach
the borrower's personal assets, distinguishing
between the mortgaged property and the borrower's personal assets assumes much greater
importance in the nonrecourse loan than in the
full recourse loan. Unfortunately, the legal definition of the mortgaged property may be hazy
at its edges, and borrowers may be able to
shield assets from nonrecourse lenders by transforming real estate into personal property.

Gregory M. Stein is a Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee College of Law. This article is excerpted from
Gregory M. Stein, The Scope of the Borrower's Liability in a NonrecourseReal EstateLoan, 55 Wash. &Lee L. Rev. 1207 (1998).
An earlier version of this article was presented at the American Bar Association's Annual Meeting in July 2000. The author can be reached at. pkWnu&kei
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Borrowers and lenders that believe nonrecourse loans are just like other loans except for
the waiver of a significant remedy soon may
discover that nonrecourse borrowers have a
greater tendency to allow or cause the condition
and value of the property to deteriorate once
foreclosure appears inevitable. This article proposes a standard that will encourage nonrecourse borrowers in distress to act as they
would if they were personally liable while also
preventing lenders from enjoying the benefits of
a remedy they agreed to forego.
TAXES AND PERSONAL LIABILITY: A
BRIEF INTRODUCTION * Real estate professionals participate in the commercial real estate
market for a wide variety of reasons. Some investors plan to construct buildings or renovate
existing structures, while others intend to operate and manage commercial property as an ongoing business. Whatever their goals, real estate
professionals typically form business entities to
hold investment property rather than holding
that property personally Investors will seek an
ownership structure that minimizes their taxes
and that shields them from personal liability on
contract and tort claims.
Traditionally, the limited partnership has
been the favored entity for holding investment
property. Partners historically have faced a substantially lower effective federal tax rate than
have corporate shareholders. Nonetheless,
some investors form corporations and forego
the enormous tax advantages of the partnership. This acquiescence to the tax collector arises primarily out of concerns about personal liability: Shareholders of corporations ordinarily
cannot be sued personally by creditors of the
business, but general partners of partnerships
can. Thus, if someone is injured on the property
or if the real estate entity does not pay its debts,
general partners may encounter unlimited lia-
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bility in tort or contract that corporate shareholders escape.
Real estate professionals often attempt to finesse this decision by forming limited partnerships and then trying to avoid the unlimited liability that this ownership form creates. In some
cases, partnerships can minimi"ze these risks
easily. A partnership that secures adequate
amounts of workers' compensation, property,
and liability insurance, for example, virtually
eliminates any chance that its general partners
will have to pay for the costs of accidents. The
partners enjoy the tax benefits of partnership
status while avoiding most of the tort risks of
that form of ownership.
The Mortgage Loan
Real estate owners also face potential contract
liabilities. The largest obligation that most real
estate partnerships confront is their mortgage
loan. If the property owner fails to pay its lender
and the property sels at foreclosure for less than
the outstanding amount of the debt, the partnership and its general partners are personally
liable for the deficiency. Thus, one bad investment can poison an otherwise successful real estate portfolio, and the unpaid lender on this bad
investment can eventually have its debt repaid
from the partnership's more successful projects
or from the general partners' personal assets.
NonrecourseLoans
For this reason and others, real estate partnerships often seek nonrecourse loans, in which the
lender agrees that the mortgaged real estate is
the only asset of the partnership and its partners
that the lender will pursue if the debt is not repaid. The other assets of the partnership and its
partners are shielded, and each partner can lose
no more than he or she agreed to invest This
nonrecourse status is accomplished by including exculpatory language in the documents, by
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which the lender agrees to look solely to the
property for satisfaction of the secured debt.
Why Would a Lender Agree
to a NonrecourseLoan?
Real estate lenders readily agree to nonrecourse loans in spite of their greater risk. Lenders are aware of the liability and other concerns
facing partners in real estate ventures and may
be willing to accommodate their partnership
clients rather than risk losing business to competing lenders. If these lenders furnish an
amount that does not exceed 70 to 80 percent of
the value of the property, they generally are
comfortable that the property can be sold at
foreclosure for an amount sufficient to repay the
debt. The slightly greater risk may translate into
a modest increase in the interest rate. Lenders
also may seek other forms of assurance that the
debt will be repaid, such as limited personal
guaranties or letters of credit. Nonrecourse
loans have become a staple of the commercial
real estate lending industry, with their prevalence and scope fluctuating with business conditions in much the same way that interest rates
and other business terms do.
DelinquentNonrecourseLoans
Lenders are considerably less accommodating after the loan becomes delinquent. Once a
borrower defaults, its lender is likely to look for
gaps in the nonrecourse provisions so it can
reach the other assets of the partnership and the
personal assets of the general partners if the
foreclosure sale should fail to generate sufficient
funds to satisfy the entire debt. If the borrower
committed fraud in obtaining the loan, for example, courts ordinarily will disregard the exculpatory language and allow the lender to recover from the partnership and perhaps from its
partners. See, e.g., Manson v. Reed, 231 Cal. Rptr.
446,451 (Ct. App. 1986) (observing, in the related context of antideficiency legislation, that "[a]
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recognized exception to [California's] anti-deficiency statute is a suit for fraud"). In the typical
case, however, a lender that agreed to a nonrecourse loan will find itself with few attractive
options if the loan turns out poorly and the
value of the property has dropped below the
outstanding amount of the debt.
Several recent cases from different parts of
the country reveal that courts are becoming
more willing to circumvent nonrecourse provisions in loan documents. In particular, courts
have begun to find that owners that fail to maintain the mortgaged property or to pay real estate taxes commit the tort of waste. The borrower that fails to repay principal and interest is
protected from the lender by the remedial provisions of the nonrecourse note, but a court may
be less willing to apply these same provisions to
absolve the borrower for the consequences of its
tortious acts. The result of these recent cases is
that partnerships and their individual partners
that believe themselves immune from personal
liability may be in for a surprise when the project fails, while lenders that agreed in advance
not to pursue their borrowers' personal assets
sometimes recover nonetheless.
In some cases, this result seems proper: Imagine the property owner who sees financial disaster looming and starts tearing out appliances,
fixtures, and building components to raise cash,
to the ultimate detriment of the foreclosing
mortgage lender. This example illustrates the
more straightforward case of active waste, in
which the owner intentionally damages the
lender's security for the owner's personal benefit. No court should shield a partnership that behaves in this fashion or any of its general partners. In contrast, the failure to maintain the
property or to pay real estate taxes constitutes,
at most, passive waste, and a court may be more
inclined to treat these omissions by the borrower as falling within the protection of the nonrecourse note.
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CHOOSING THE RIGHT ENTITY: A CLOSER LOOK * Real estate professionals, like
other business people, want to maximize their
profit and to minimize their risk. To attain these
ends, they must minimize their federal tax
obligations while exposing themselves to the
least possible tort and contract liability, two
goals that in some ways demand contradictory
actions. The first and perhaps the most important decision that any real estate professional
must make is the selection of the entity that will
hold title to the real estate.
The Corporation
The corporation offers the greatest protection
available against personal liability. The corporate property owner, a separate legal entity
under state law, is fully liable for all contracts
into which it enters and for all torts for which
the law imposes liability on an owner, but the
individual shareholders of the corporation are
not. Investors who hold shares of corporations
that own real estate can cap their losses at the
amount they agree in advance to invest and
need not worry that they will be called upon to
make unanticipated contributions in the future.
No other form of ownership better limits its investors' personal liability, a privilege that corporate owners pay for when they calculate their
taxes. As a separate entity, the corporation must
file its own tax return and pay taxes on any income at the corporate level. Distributions to individual shareholders then are taxable to those
shareholders, with the result that each shareholder effectively pays a double tax.
The General Partnership
The general partnership lies at the other extreme, offering major tax advantages to its partners but exposing them to greater liability. The
general partnership is not taxed separately at
the partnership level, and the double tax problem vanishes. Each general partner, however, is
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personally liable in full for all partnership liabilities, including those incurred on behalf of the
partnership by the other partners. Taxes are
kept to a minimum, but liability is unpredictable and potentially limitless.
Statutory Variants
At their simplest, the general partnership option and the corporate option both offer investors a major advantage paired with a major
flaw, which is to say that the entrepreneur confronted with only these two options would
need to make an important initial choice. This
harsh choice has been softened, however, by
statutory relaxation of these two forms, with S
corporations, limited partnerships, and, most
recently, limited liability entities offering investors greater flexibility.
The S Corporation
The major drawback to the business corporation from the perspective of the real estate investor lies in its heavier tax burden. These extra
costs can be eliminated if the corporation qualifies as an S corporation. If the corporation so
qualifies, it is taxed like a partnership but provides its investors with the limited liability of a
corporation. The S corporation has never become as popular as these dual advantages might
suggest, however, because of the numerous restrictions Congress placed on S corporations
and the burdensome record keeping involved.
The Limited Partnership
Just as S corporation status softens the tax
blow for certain corporate shareholders, the use
of the limited partnership form softens the liability exposure of some partners in partnerships. Limited partnerships possess two classes
of partners, limited and general. General partners of limited partnerships, like general partners of general partnerships, still face unlimited
liability. Limited partners, in contrast, are treat-
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ed much like corporate shareholders and may
lose only those amounts that they invest initially or commit to contribute in the future.
Unlike the S corporation, the limited partnership form has been enormously popular within
the real estate industry. It is an excellent choice
for the partnership that has at least one general
partner willing to live with the risk of unlimited
personal liability but that also has other investors that insist on both limited liability and
the tax advantages of a partnership. This form
of ownership is not without its own drawbacks,
however. The general partners of a limited partnership retain unlimited liability in contract and
tort, and those limited partners that participate
in the management and control of a limited
partnership risk being treated as general partners for tort and contract liability purposes.
The Limited Liability Company
The limited liability company has become an
important option for real estate investors during the last several years. While the contours of
this entity are less consistent from state to state
than are those of the other available entities,
limited liability companies are designed to allow their investors both limited liability and
partnership tax treatment. In addition, recent
regulatory changes have simplified the process
by which the Internal Revenue Service will classify business entities for tax purposes. Under
the new "check-the-box" regulations, many
noncorporate entities such as limited liability
companies and limited partnerships will more
easily qualify for partnership tax treatment.
Real estate investors have been quick to recognize that limited liability companies can offer
the combination of favorable tax treatment and
limited liability that they previously had to
struggle to attain. If the limited liability company has not already surpassed the limited partnership as the entity of choice for real estate investors, it is likely to do so soon. Nonetheless,
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limited partnerships, including the large number of limited partnerships established before
the growth in popularity of the limited liability
company, will remain important for many years
to come.
Maximizing the Advantages;
Minimizing the Disadvantages
The business corporation and the general
partnership each possess one major advantage
accompanied by one major drawback. Statutorily created variants of these two entities-the S
corporation and the limited partnership-are
hybrids, each offering the major advantage
along with a less undesirable drawback. Investors seek to improve on these two variants by
maximizing the advantages of each of these
forms while paring back still further on the disadvantages of each. The disadvantages to the S
corporation are created by the Internal Revenue
Code and cannot be modified in the corporate
charter or in the corporation's contractual arrangements, although careful planning and
oversight will reduce some of these negative effects. Investors who plan ahead carefully, however, are more likely either to turn to the limited
partnership and then look for ways to eliminate
or minimize the liability risks that characterize
this type of entity or, more recently, to choose
the limited liability company.
REDUCING THE RISKS OF THE LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP * Most of the liability risks
that general partners in limited partnerships encounter fall into the two broad categories of
torts and contracts.
Tort Risk: Insurance
Tort risks cannot be eliminated, of course.
Accidents and disasters happen, and the universe of potential plaintiffs is limitless. But the
magnitude of these risks can be minimized
through the use of insurance. Prudent purchas-
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es of sufficient liability, property, and workers'
compensation insurance convert small risks of
devastating liability into modest and easily
quantified periodic premium payments. Wellrun partnerships will obtain adequate amounts
of each type of insurance, particularly if state or
local law, or their lender, so requires.
Contract Risk. Nonrecourse Provisions
Avoiding contractual liability is more problematic. The only way to reduce the risk of contract liability is for the limited partnership to ask
each party with which it contracts to agree in
advance not to look to the personal assets of the
partnership or its partners if'the partnership
should breach the contract. Most parties with
which a partnership contracts would not seriously entertain such a request But for the
largest liability the typical commercial real estate limited partnership faces, this problem has
an amazing tendency to vanish. For, much to
the surprise of anyone unfamiliar with the real
estate market, lenders routinely agree to precisely such provisions, when they lend on a
nonrecourse basis. In short, if a real estate limited partnership asks its largest creditor for a
promise not to sue the partnership or its partners personally, the creditor often will agree
without much argument.
Why Would a Lender Agree
To Lend on a NonrecourseBasis?
There are several reasons why a lender
would agree to provide a nonrecourse loan. To
begin with, lenders understand exactly why
general partners of limited partnerships are so
concerned with obtaining nonrecourse financing and are willing to provide nonrecourse
loans as a business enticement, particularly if
competing lenders are doing so. In addition, in
a real estate mortgage loan, the primary security is the real estate itself. Most lenders recognize
that their borrowers may be unable to satisfy a
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personal judgment by the time of any default on
the note and lend under the assumption that
they will have nothing else to look to beyond
the secured real estate. That, after all, is one of
the reasons lenders insist on a mortgage in the
first place.
Moreover, in evaluating applications for loans
to be secured by commercial real estate, lenders
are most concerned with the income stream that
tenant leases will generate and with the owner's
expertise in managing commercial real estate.
This contrasts sharply with the residential real
estate loan market, in which the lender is more
likely to scrutinize the income and assets of the
individual borrower. If the commercial lender is
more concerned with the income stream from
the property and with the skill of the property
manager than with the net worth of the partnership and its partners, then the lender that agrees
to a nonrecourse loan is relinquishing a remedy
that it sees as relatively unimportant. Lenders
also realize that extending a nonrecourse loan to
a single-asset real estate partnership places them
in a position that is little worse than the one they
would be in if they had lent with full recourse to
a single-asset corporation.
Lenders that agree to exculpatory language
also may insist on extra comfort in the form of a
larger equity contribution or additional consideration in the form of a higher interest rate. The
lender's determination of what the loan-tovalue ratio should be for any given loan factors
in its assessment of the risks of that loan. For a
nonrecourse loan, which by definition is at least
as risky as a loan with recourse, the lender may
insist on a lower loan-to-value ratio, which is to
say a higher equity investment by the borrower.
Similarly, the lender may charge a slightly higher interest rate to reflect the slightly increased
risk that its voluntary waiver of an available
remedy creates.
Lenders also may assent to lending on a nonrecourse basis if their risk is reduced through
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the use of an external credit enhancement device, such as a standby letter of credit or a personal guaranty. If the lender surrenders the
right to seek personal recourse from the partnership and all of its general partners and receives in exchange a letter of credit issued by a
bank or a personal guaranty from a specific
partner or a creditworthy third party, the lender
actually may be in a better position than before,
with two or more different remedies now available against two or more different sources of repayment. This may be an imperfect option from
the borrower's perspective, because at least
some of the partners, or the entity itself, are likely to retain some personal liability under a letter
of credit reimbursement agreement or a personal guaranty. However, alternative obligations
such as these may be limited as to duration, dollar amount, types of risk covered, and types of
assets that can be reached. Most general partners would be extremely pleased if they and
their partnership could avoid unlimited liability
in exchange for, say, an agreement under which
one specific partner is liable for the first two
years of the loan, up to a maximum amount of
$500,000, for any liabilities arising under federal
and state environmental laws. In addition to
limiting the liability of the partnership and its
general partners, these alternative forms of
credit enhancement also may protect those parties' balance sheets, thereby enhancing their access to further credit if they should need it in the
future. From the lender's point of view, even the
limited use of credit enhancement devices provides partial insurance against the most worrisome hazards during the periods of highest
risk, such as construction.
Finally, until 1986, limited partners received
substantial tax advantages when their partnerships borrowed on a nonrecourse basis rather
than on a recourse basis. A partner can deduct
allocable partnership losses up to the amount of
that partner's basis in the partnership, and a lim-
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ited partner's basis is increased to account for
nonrecourse debt but generally not for recourse
debt. This advantage caused passive investors to
favor limited partnerships with nonrecourse
debt. Partnerships that wished to attract capital
almost had to borrow on a nonrecourse basis, a
fact which lenders understood fully. See
Restatement (Third) of Property:Mortgages §1.1 reporters' note (1997) (discussing tax consequences of nonrecourse loans). The tax shelter
benefits of nonrecourse debt were reduced significantly by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
Note that this article generally assumes that a
nonrecourse loan to a limited partnership is one
in which the creditor agrees not to seek personal recourse against the partnership borrower or
its general partners. Borrowers and lenders
sometimes may agree to a more limited type of
nonrecourse debt, in which the lender is permitted to pursue other assets of the partnership
but not the assets of its partners. The same issues that arise in the broader type of nonrecourse loan also are relevant in this narrower
type, and this article's analysis applies equally
well to both types of loans. If the limited partnership owns just one real estate asset, the difference between the two types of nonrecourse
debt turns out to be largely insignificant, with
protection of the partners being the main goal of
the nonrecourse provisions either way.
WHAT RECOURSE DOES A NONRECOURSE LENDER HAVE? * The prevalence
of the limited partnership form in the real estate
industry, the validity of the many reasons limited partnerships have for insisting upon nonrecourse debt, and the lack of grounds for lenders
to object have combined to ensure that much
commercial real estate is subject to nonrecourse
debt. If a project is successful and the borrower
pays that debt, the nonrecourse provisions turn
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out to have been immaterial. But that is not always what happens, and a nonrecourse lender
holding a loan in default must decide which of
its available remedies to pursue.
Pre-Foreclosure Remedies
In the short term, the lender may attempt to
employ one or more of the pre-foreclosure remedies provided for in the mortgage or under
state law, such as:
" The appointment of a receiver;
* The activation of an assignment of leases and
rents; or
* The seeking of possession.
The lender's use of these pre-foreclosure remedies may alert the borrower to the seriousness
of the lender's concerns, may preserve the value
of the property, and may reduce the magnitude
of the default, thereby lessening the need for the
lender to foreclose and reducing the risk that it
will come up short if it must.
Workout or Deed-in-Lieu
Even if these pre-foredosure remedies do not
accomplish their goals, the lender still may not
need to foreclose if the parties are able to negotiate a workout agreement or if the partnership
deeds the property to the lender in lieu of foreclosure. If none of these less extreme alternatives prods the borrower into curing the default
or satisfying the lender's concerns in some
other way, the lender ultimately may decide to
foreclose the mortgage or deed of trust in accordance with state law.
Foreclosure and Deficiency Judgment
In the worst case for all the parties, the foreclosure sale will fail to generate proceeds sufficient to pay off the outstanding debt, which by
then will have been augmented by overdue interest, late fees, legal fees, and other related
costs, and the lender next must seek a deficien-

March 2001

cy judgment. It is this last option-pursuit of a
deficiency judgment-that generally is unavailable to the nonrecourse lender. The lender that
accepts a nonrecourse note risks coming up
short if the borrower defaults and the proceeds
of the ensuing foreclosure sale are less than the
outstanding amount of the debt. Antideficiency
legislation and procedural limitations such as
one-action rules can have the same effect.
Arguments for the Inapplicability
of NonrecourseProvisions
By this time, counsel for the lender will have
examined the loan documents carefully, searching for legal arguments that might allow the
lender to reach other assets beyond the mortgaged real estate. If the lender may make a
claim against a guarantor or bonding company
or may draw on a letter of credit, it will seek to
do so. If the borrower committed some impropriety, such as misrepresenting its financial condition in the documents or the loan application
or diverting funds to other projects in violation
of the terms of the loan, the lender may succeed
in arguing that the nonrecourse provisions are
inapplicable. If the nonrecourse provisions were
drafted poorly, then the lender may argue that
the loan allows for some recourse against the
borrower. But in the ordinary case, the nonrecourse lender that expects the foreclosure sale to
generate insufficient funds is in a real quandary
by this point: It has knowingly waived a remedy that, as things turned out, it needs to use.
Some lenders facing this dilemma have looked
to the courts, which occasionally will permit
nonrecourse lenders to recover. Judicial treatment of this type raises the question of just how
nonrecourse a nonrecourse loan is.
CASE LAW ON NONRECOURSE LENDING
9 Three leading cases on nonrecourse lending
examine the question of what actions constitute
waste in the setting of a nonrecourse loan.
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Prudential: Waste Found
From the property owner's perspective, Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Spencer's
Kenosha Bowl Inc., 404 N.W.2d 109 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987), presented something even better than a
nonrecourse loan. The original owner of commercial real estate borrowed funds and granted
a mortgage, and subsequently sold the property to the defendant, which did not personally
assume the obligation to repay the debt. The
lender's only recourse was against the property
and the original borrower, and it does not appear that the borrower's grantee had any contractual relationship with the lender at all. At
foreclosure, the property sold for $360,000 less
than the debt. The trial court listed nine different forms of waste that it found the grantee to
have committed, causing total damage to the
property of $445,000. Eight of the nine listed
items were failures to maintain the property
physically; the ninth and largest, in the amount
of $199,000, arose from the grantee's failure to
pay property taxes. The trial court held the
grantee personally liable for all nine of these
items but limited the total award to the amount
of the deficiency.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment in full. In reaching this result, the
court had to resolve two separate issues, neither
of which had been precisely presented before in
Wisconsin.
First, the court decided that "the waste doctrine permits a mortgagee to maintain an action
for waste against a nonassuming grantee of a
mortgagor." Id. at 112. If the lender was permitted to use a waste argument to recover personally from a property owner such as this one,
with which it had no privity of contract, then a
court would likely find that a lender also could
recover personally from a nonrecourse borrower, with which it would have a detailed, though
limited, contractual relationship.
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Second, the court conduded that the failure
to pay real estate taxes constitutes passive
waste, which is actionable in just the way that
active waste is, because either type of waste impairs the lender's security. See id. at 113.
Travelers: Waste Found
Travelers Insurance Co. v. 633 Third Associates,
14 E3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994), raised similar issues,
but with more money at stake and a less sympathetic group of investors. The borrower, a
limited partnership, distributed $4 million to its
partners in 1990 after it learned that its office
building would lose some major tenants and
prepared soon afterwards to distribute another
$17 million. The lender that had provided a
$145 million nonrecourse loan sued to set aside
the first distribution and to enjoin the second as
fraudulent conveyances. The federal district
court, applying New York law, denied a temporary restraining order and dismissed the
claims because the loan was nonrecourse and
the lender had no claim to the partnership's
cash assets, but the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case.
See Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 1991
WL 236842, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1991) (decining to enter temporary restraining order);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 973 F2d 82,
83 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting prior disposition of
case); id.at 86 (noting that, while plaintiff may
not have direct access to funds already distributed by defendant, "plaintiff nonetheless may
have standing under New York's Fraudulent
Conveyance Act to set aside the conveyance if
the conveyance caused a diminution in the
value of the real property, to which plaintiff is
entitled to look in the event of default").
The landowner's troubles continued, and on
January 1,1992, it failed to remit its semiannual
installment of real estate taxes in the amount of
$3.8 million, as well as its monthly loan pay-
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ment. Twelve days later, the partnership distributed the $17 million to its partners. The lender
filed for foreclosure the next day and then
amended its complaint to allege that the borrower's distribution to its partners rendered it
incapable of performing its obligations under
the loan, including its obligation to pay property taxes. The amended complaint added claims
for equitable relief from waste and for specific
performance of the borrower's obligations. The
district court dismissed the complaint once
again, but the Second Circuit reversed. See
TravelersIns. Co. v. 633 ThirdAssocs., 816 F Supp.
197,206 (S.D.N.Y 1993) (referring to funds previously distributed by borrower to its partners
as "monies which are placed beyond Travelers'
reach by the non-recourse provisions of the
mortgage"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 14 E3d
114 (2d Cir. 1994). In its decision, the Second
Circuit affirmed portions of the district court's
opinion that are not relevant here, reversed the
rest of the lower court's opinion, and remanded
once again. See Travelers, 14 E3d at 126.
The Second Circuit reached two related conclusions: The failure to pay real estate taxes constitutes waste under New York law; and the
lender could bring claims for waste, for specific
performance, and for setting aside the distributions, notwithstanding the nonrecourse provisions in the loan documents. The court focused
its attention on the first issue. After reviewing
the largely inapposite precedent and several
cases from other jurisdictions, the Second
Circuit determined that "the intentional failure
to pay property taxes where there is an obligation to do so or where the failure is fraudulent
constitutes waste under the law of New York."
Id. at 123. The court did not explain how one's
failure to pay real property taxes when required
can ever be unintentional. See id. at 126 n.1
(Mishler, J., dissenting) (noting that "[tihe mere
failure by a mortgagor in possession to pay
property taxes is willful since the mortgagor is
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chargeable with knowledge that taxes are due
and constitute a prior lien").
The court did not discuss the second issue
and appears to have assumed that the actions
could be maintained in spite of the nonrecourse
language in the mortgage.
Chetek: No Waste Found
Conversely, in Chetek State Bank v. Barberg,489
N.W2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), review denied,
491 N.W2d 769 (Wis. 1992), the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals concluded that the failure to
pay real estate taxes and mortgage interest does
not constitute waste. Chetek involved the foreclosure of a nonrecourse mortgage that led to a
deficiency of $1.4 million. Conceding the validity of the nonrecourse provisions, the lenders
nonetheless sought $192,000 in unpaid real estate taxes and $151,000 in unpaid mortgage interest from two of the general partners of the
partnership that had owned the property The
appellate court held in favor of the two general
partners, concluding that the lender had not
proven that the borrower had committed all of
the elements of the tort of waste. Chetek cited
Spencer's in passing but failed to give any explanation for its contrary result.
WHAT DOES "NONRECOURSE" MEAN?.
The use of the adjective "nonrecourse" suggests that a real estate lender agreeing to this
type of loan waives all of its rights to seek satisfaction from the personal assets of its borrower. This suggestion is misleading. One of the
sources of this confusion that borrowers,
lenders, and courts may face is a linguistic one,
with the use of the word "nonrecourse" causing the parties to overlook the fact that these
loans do not fully insulate borrowers. The socalled nonrecourse loan actually provides the
lender with partial or limited recourse to the
borrower's personal assets.
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The Starting Point: Loans with Full Recourse
In a typical real estate loan with full recourse,
the documents will not expressly state the parties' intentions as to the personal liability of the
borrower. By not departing from settled law in
the loan documents, the borrower and the
lender implicitly agree to abide by the state's
default rules, which usually are dear. The borrower effectively guarantees to the lender that
the net foreclosure sale price will be no lower
than the total obligation of the borrower at the
time of the sale. If the foreclosure sale proceeds
turn out to be insufficient to pay the outstanding debt, the lender next may obtain a deficiency judgment and seek satisfaction from the borrower's other assets. If the borrower happens to
be a partnership, each of its general partners
will be personally liable for payment of this
partnership obligation.
The borrower's liability may be limited by
substantive laws such as antideficiency legislation and by procedural foreclosure restrictions
such as one-action rules, limitations that vary
depending on the state and on the type of property involved. The scope of the borrower's liability also may be somewhat fuzzy at its edges,
with the body of state law on which the parties
rely certain to contain some ambiguities and
open questions not yet addressed by the legislature or by the courts. But while the parties to a
full recourse loan may not know precisely what
they have agreed to, they will have acceded to a
fairly predictable body of doctrine, however illdefined at its borders and however changeable
as new issues arise.
The Contrast: Zero Recourse Loans
Imagine now a mortgage loan with the
strongest possible nonrecourse language. To
what extent do the parties to this nonrecourse
loan plan to deviate from the traditional full recourse model? A court might presume from
this forceful language that the parties intended

43

to reverse the standard full recourse rules completely. By shifting from a full recourse loan to
a loan with no recourse, the parties must have
intended to benefit the borrower in all of those
circumstances in which the lender otherwise
would have been protected. As a result, the
lender's only option is to pursue the secured
property, and the borrower and its partners are
completely absolved of all personal liability in
all instances. I will refer to loans such as these
as "zero recourse" loans, to distinguish them
from the partial or limited recourse loans discussed below.
Even if a zero recourse provision accurately
reflects the parties' mutual intent, a court may
have valid reasons for refusing to enforce it. An
obvious illustration of a case in which enforcement would be inappropriate is one in which
the borrower proves to have engaged in fraud.
If a nonrecourse borrower were to lie when applying for credit and then bribe an appraiser to
overstate the value of the property, a court
would allow the lender to recover any resulting
damages. The court would be correct in assuming that neither these parties nor any hypothetical reasonable parties could have intended, or
should be allowed to agree to, an arrangement
shielding the borrower from the consequences
of its own criminal and intentionally tortious actions. The parties, or at least one of them, probably did not intend to depart from the traditional recourse rules to this degree, and even if
they did, a court should not implement that
agreement indiscriminately In fact, if the nonrecourse provision is negotiated at all, one of the
first carveouts the lender is likely to demand is
a fraud exception.
The Realistic Nonrecourse Loan:
Limited Recourse
A document that contains nonrecourse language manifestly intends to deviate from the
usual full recourse model to some extent, and a
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court ought not allow the lender full recourse in
a case in which the parties plainly agreed to
something else. At the same time, most borrowers and lenders probably do not intend a complete reversal of the full recourse rules in all circumstances, and even if they do, courts properly are reluctant to enforce a provision that invariably absolves the borrower. The term "nonrecourse," as commonly used, often proves to
be misleading. Parties that diverge from the
standard full recourse model usually recognize
that the borrower will remain personally liable
in some more narrowly defined set of circumstances. This article sometimes will refer to
these more realistic types of loans as "partial recourse" or "limited recourse" loans, although it
should be evident that they are nothing more
than standard, if inaccurately named, nonrecourse loans. Once it becomes apparent that a
nominal nonrecourse loan usually is a loan with
some limited recourse, the obvious next problem is the determination of how limited that recourse is.
In a realistic nonrecourse loan, which actually is a limited recourse loan, the parties jettison
the default package of state liability rules and
supersede it with doctrine they create themselves. The lender agrees to waive a powerful
remedy in some circumstances. In exchange, the
borrower presumably offers the lender some
consideration such as a higher interest rate, a
larger equity contribution, or, perhaps, nothing
more than its resolution to borrow from this
lender rather than from a competitor. If the parties refine this new set of rules carefully and reasonably in their documents and limit the lender's remedies with some precision, a court ordinarily will enforce their agreement as written.
Problems arise, however, when the parties
fail to specify all of the details of their limited recourse relationship. The borrower and the lender may inadvertently fail to clarify the meaning
of their agreement due to haste, sloppiness, or a
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lack of legal sophistication. Alternatively, the
parties may deliberately decline to address all of
these complexities for a variety of reasons. They
may fear delaying the transaction and losing a
short-lived business opportunity over an issue
that they optimistically view as unlikely to arise.
They may wish to keep their legal fees as low as
possible. One party may prefer not to draw attention to some subtle ambiguity in what the
other believes they have agreed to, thereby accepting an uncertain "maybe" rather than risking a certain "no." Whatever the reason, the parties may have agreed upon an incomplete legal
relationship by employing a legally significant
term without concurring as to its definition.
Any document can contain such a failing, of
course, but by opting out of well-defined state
recourse rules and choosing instead to create
their own, the parties increase their chances of
reaching an agreement that is incomplete.
A court called upon to resolve a dispute that
results from this type of omission must place
this set of loan documents at an appropriate
point on the spectrum between full recourse and
zero recourse, recognizing all the while that the
parties meant to depart from the standard full
recourse rules to some extent. In order to infer
the level of personal liability that the parties intended, the court will need to contemplate more
carefully the nature of nonrecourse loans. A nonrecourse loan proves to be a loan in which the
lender agrees to look solely to the mortgaged
property in far more instances than otherwise
would be the case. This more precise definition
of a nonrecourse loan emphasizes that the nonrecourse lender agrees to waive its access to
other assets of the partnership and its partners in
many more cases than it would in a full recourse
loan. The remainder of this artide addresses the
question of just how many more cases.
In many, but not all, of the factual situations
that might arise, the lender has agreed prospectively to relinquish its access to the borrower's
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other resources, with the inevitable result that
the mortgaged property takes on additional importance. The court cannot estimate accurately
how much personal recourse the parties might
have intended for the lender to retain until it
considers more closely the nature of the mortgaged property, which is the only security that
unquestionably is available to the lender in all
cases. Once it understands just what the mortgaged property is, the court is in a better position to decide when the lender may look beyond the mortgaged property and how far.
Defining the Mortgaged Property with Care
The property that a borrower mortgages to its
lender is a collection of physical and financial
attributes. The physical traits of the mortgaged
property generally are well understood and
agreed upon by both parties, consisting of corporeal, property-like features such as the land
itself. Other tangible property attributes frequently included within the scope of a mortgage are the improvements that are on the land
or that will be constructed on the land, timber,
and crops, even though these may not yet exist
at the time of the grant of the mortgage. While
not every borrower intends to grant its lender
rights in all of these physical aspects of the
property, the parties to any particular mortgage
are likely to agree which physical property
rights the borrower is mortgaging to its lender
and will draft the granting clause of their mortgage accordingly.
The mortgaged property is more than just a
collection of physical traits, however, and also
includes financial attributes that are less tangible than bricks, mortar, coal, or timber. In a commercial real estate loan, one of the most important characteristics of the real property security
is its capacity to produce rental income. A
lender is likely to decide whether and how
much it will lend on the basis of the overall
value of the property, and this value will large-
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ly be a function of the property's ability to generate rents. The commercial lender is sure to inspect the land and to estimate the replacement
cost of the buildings on it, but likely will be at
least as concerned with the identities of the tenants, the amount of rent that each of these tenants is paying, and the number of years remaining in each lease term. Both parties will understand from the outset that the lender is concerned with these components of the property's
value, and the borrower typically will provide
all relevant documents to the lender at the time
it requests the loan so that the lender may undertake a due diligence review. In addition, the
loan may be conditioned on the lender's receipt
of tenant estoppel letters, which authenticate
and verify the major provisions of the leases; an
assignment of leases and rents from the borrower, which provides the lender with a security interest in this important income stream; and
subordination, nondisturbance, and attornment
agreements from the major tenants, which assure the lender that these tenants will remain
after a foreclosure.
A lender considering extending a loan will
instruct its appraiser to scrutinize the entire collection of physical and financial property rights
that the borrower has offered to mortgage and
then to place a value on that set of rights. The
lender well knows that subsequent buyers such
as foreclosure sale purchasers are likely to calculate value in much the same manner. Particularly in a nonrecourse loan, in which the proceeds of a future foreclosure sale may be the
sole source of repayment to the lender, the
lender will want to guess at how potential future bidders will value the property and then
will decide how much it is willing to lend on
the basis of that calculation. The lender will determine how much it can lend against the mortgaged property only after its appraiser has examined the entire web of physical and financial
features that together constitute the property
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and then has placed a value on this tangled collection of attributes.
ConvertingMortgaged
Propertyinto Personalty
More worrisome to the lender is the fact that
the borrower possesses the power to transform
elements of the mortgaged property into personalty. Owners easily can convert physical
components of the mortgaged property into
personal assets of the borrower partnership. A
shopping center owner might remove physical
components of the structure and sell them for
scrap, or a developer could purchase building
materials with the proceeds of a construction
loan and then sell them for cash before they are
incorporated into the building. In each case,
items that were a part of the mortgaged property or that were intended to become a part of
the mortgaged property are transformed into
or left as personal property. These personal assets, and the cash they later are exchanged for,
might appear to be beyond the nonrecourse
lender's reach.
Property owners also can transform financial
components of the mortgaged property into
personalty. The owner of a distressed shopping
center might offer its anchor tenant a substantial
rent discount in exchange for a prepayment of
two years of that reduced rent. The owner thereby transforms a stream of 24 future monthly
payments, to be enjoyed by the owner or owners of the center over that extended time period,
into a discounted prepayment, to be fully enjoyed now by itself or by its partners. Any entity considering bidding on the property at a foreclosure sale during the next two years should
discover that the anchor tenant will not be paying any rent for the duration of that period and
should factor that foregone portion of the income stream into its calculation of the property's value, downgrading its bid accordingly.
The nonrecourse borrower converts the rent
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that a particular tenant would pay over a protracted future period, which was a financial
component of the security, into a lump sum
cash prepayment to the borrower, which the
lender or a subsequent owner of the property
may be unable to recover.
This is not to say that a court will always enforce such agreements. See 11 U.S.C. §548 (allowing bankruptcy trustee to set aside certain
constructively fraudulent transfers); Restatement
(Third) of Property: Mortgages §4.4 (1997) (allowing receiver to disaffirm this type of "sweetheart" agreement if it contravenes provisions of
senior mortgage or if mortgage was in default
when agreement was made and agreement is
not commercially reasonable). Borrower actions
of this type often are prohibited in the loan documents, as well, but a court may grant the
lender a remedy even if the documents do not
specifically authorize it. Actions of this type appear to meet the definition of waste, and a court
may enjoin the borrower from acting in a way
that will harm the property or may allow the
lender to recover personally from the borrower
after the borrower acts in a way that has
harmed the property.
The mortgaged property turns out to be a
form of security that is both blurry and perme-

able. It is legally blurry in that the parties operate against a background of uncertainty to the
extent that there are any pertinent unsettled
questions of state law: The edges of the legal definition of this asset may not be sharp. It is financially blurry in the sense that its value can
fluctuate dramatically from time to time. The
mortgaged property is permeable in that the
borrower easily may transform elements of this
property, which appear to be part of the
lender's security, into personal property, which
may seem to be beyond the lender's grasp.
Even scrupulously honest and fair parties
may disagree over whether seemingly wellmeaning borrower actions transform vulnera-
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ble property into shielded property, given how
porous the membrane between them is and
given the compelling incentives for the borrower to traverse it. The nonrecourse lender will be
more concerned than the full recourse lender
about these legal and financial uncertainties because the nonrecourse lender has a great deal
more to lose. The blurriness and permeability of
the mortgaged property translate into higher
risk for the nonrecourse lender.

recourse. Both parties recognize from the beginning that good planning, careful negotiation,
and skilled professional management might be
wholly undercut by rising interest rates, mounting local unemployment, and the insolvency of
an anchor tenant. The nonrecourse lender gives
up its personal claims against the borrower arising from these market conditions, with the result that a large portion of the lending risk that
ordinarily resides with the borrower migrates to
the lender.

Moral Hazard and the Indispensability
of Some Borrower Liability
Many lenders are willing to tolerate the financial risks of nonrecourse loans, granting
their borrowers the financial security and tax
advantages that those borrowers demand by
agreeing not to seek personal recourse. These
same lenders, however, probably wish to preserve the psychological characteristics of full recourse loans, particularly the strong motivation
that the fear of personal liability produces in
most borrowers. Stated bluntly, even those
lenders willing to forego personal claims
against their borrowers want those borrowers
to behave as though they believe and fear that
their loans provide for full personal recourse.
The previous discussion began to illuminate the
inherent inconsistencies between the financial
and psychological aspects of nonrecourse loans.
The discussion that follows examines this moral
hazard problem in greater detail.
If a borrower defaults, its lender forecloses,
and the debt exceeds the net foreclosure sale
proceeds plus the value of any backup security,
then the nonrecourse lender may suffer a loss
that a full recourse lender might have avoided.
The reason why the property sells for less than
the debt may be important, however. At one extreme, the nonrecourse lender bears the risk that
external market conditions will degenerate to
the point at which it suffers a loss that it would
not have suffered had the loan provided for full

Conversely, the nonrecourse lender never
should bear financial responsibility for intentional bad acts or gross negligence on the part of
the borrower. These types of actions often will
run afoul of criminal, tort, or bankruptcy laws.
Whether or not they do, the lender should be
permitted to recover the damages that it suffers
as a result of such misfeasance when a foreclosure sale fails to make it whole, even if the parties previously agreed that the loan would be
nonrecourse.
Most cases fall between these two extremes,
and a nonrecourse borrower that sees problems
looming might begin to respond to these troubles in a variety of ways. First, the borrower
might act responsibly, or even altruistically, exerting tremendous effort and perhaps spending
additional funds in an all-out attempt to save

the property. The altruistic borrower might act
in this way even though it knows that the loan
is nonrecourse and that it might be better off financially if it simply gives up. Second, the borrower might react more pragmatically, by allowing certain features of the property to dete-

riorate while still maintaining the property at a
reduced level. This more pragmatic borrower
recognizes that the finite funds available are insufficient to meet all of the property's needs and
that these limited funds must be budgeted to
address only the most serious problems. Third,
the borrower might react more selfishly, by beginning to transform realty into personalty or
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simply by failing to transform personalty into
realty in situations in which it otherwise would
have. This more self-centered borrower acts out
of its belief that business failure is nearly inevitable, and sees no reason to expend effort or
funds to maintain the value of property it soon
will lose.
The fear of this last sort of behavior is one of
the rationales frequently given for having a law
of waste. As Judge Posner notes in the context of
the life tenancy:
"[Tihe common law doctrine of waste.. .mediates between the competing interests of life tenants and remaindermen. A life tenant will have
an incentive to maximize not the value of the
property, that is, the present value of the entire
stream of future earnings obtainable from it, but
only the present value of the earnings stream
obtainable during his expected lifetime. He will
therefore want to cut timber before it has attained its mature growth-even though the present value of the timber would be greater if the
cutting of some or all of it were postponed-if
the added value from waiting would enure to
the remainderman. The law of waste forbade
this." Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law 83 (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 5th
ed. 1998).
The boundaries between these different types
of behavior are indistinct, of course, and many
borrowers will act inconsistently. A borrower
might choose two or more of these approaches
concurrently or change its approach over time.
This is not to suggest that borrowers are irrational or foolish, although some of them certainly are. Borrowers may adjust their responses over time as conditions change, and they
sometimes will have to act before they have access to all the facts-or time for all the forethought-they might desire.
Any lender will care about how its borrower
responds to adverse conditions, but the nonre-
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course lender has more at stake than does the
full recourse lender. In a full recourse loan, the
lender wields an immense psychological stick,
stating, in effect, "You may manage the property as you wish, but if I suffer a loss, you will
pay." The threat of unlimited personal liability
is sure to inspire a significant amount of fear in
a borrower partnership and its partners. That
fear, in turn, will motivate the borrower to act
prudently and with respect for the lender's interests, even if the borrower's assets could not
come dose to making the borrower whole. The
personally liable borrower may see little reason
to conserve its funds if it believes that the funds
it spends now may save the property while any
funds it conserves will end up satisfying the
lender's inevitable personal judgment anyway.
The lender that agrees to a detailed limited
recourse loan modifies this statement somewhat, stating, "You may manage the property
as you wish, but if I suffer a loss in any of the
following enumerated ways, you will pay."
This modified type of nonrecourse loan falls between the two extremes discussed in the text
and eliminates some of the uncertainty that is
this article's concern.
The zero recourse loan turns the full recourse
loan on its head, with the lender effectively stating, "You may manage the property as you
wish, period." The borrower may lose its equity
in the property, but nothing more. At one level,
the lender is hardly in a position to complain
about the unavailability of a remedy that it
agreed in advance to waive. But this problem
extends beyond the loss of a financial remedy,
for once the nonrecourse borrower believes that
the property's value has dropped permanently
below the outstanding amount of the debt, the
borrower simply may resign itself to losing its
investment in the property. This problem, a
variation of the moral hazard problem described by scholars of law and economics, can
be devastating to the lender. See Posner, supra,
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at 121 (noting that "[tihe tendency of an insured
to relax his efforts to prevent the occurrence of
[a] risk that he has insured against because he
has shifted the risk to an insurance company is
known as 'moral hazard").
In a nonrecourse loan, the lender acts as the
insurer by promising the borrower that its potential losses are capped. The borrower's equity
contribution serves much the same purpose as a
deductible and offers the lender some assurance
that the borrower will be attentive to the property's needs. If the borrower loses this deductible and is not required to contribute any
further copayments, the lender has great cause
for worry. The "insured" borrower will have littIe incentive to preserve the property any further if the entire remaining value of that property is pledged to another.
The borrower may minimize its efforts to care
for the property if foreclosure seems inevitable
and its own personal losses are limited. It will
see little potential for gain from hard work and
resourcefulness if any additional investment of
time or money will do nothing more than raise
the value of the property closer to the amount of
the debt, thereby reducing the lender's loss
without improving the borrower's position.
Moreover, borrower inattention in the future
will lead to no further borrower loss because the
loan eliminates any risk beyond the amount already committed and lost. Therefore, the nonrecourse borrower is likely to view attempts to salvage troubled property as effort that might help
the lender but not itself, and may simply resign
itself to losing its previous investment or, worse,
may scavenge whatever it can for its own benefit. The absence of any remaining motivation to
save the property from foreclosure, such as fear
of further losses, may transform the borrower's
attitude from one of nervous creative energy to
one of disinterest, apathy, or selfishness.
The Second Circuit has recognized this point.
In its discussion of the history of waste law in
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Travelers, the court observed that "[anaction for
waste gave the owner a remedy against a tenant
who undermined the long-term profit maximizing potential of the property in order to realize
short-term gains....In this way, it has been suggested by one commentator, the doctrine of
waste developed to force tenants to manage the
property as if they were the owner of the property." Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 14
E3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 64-65 (3d ed.
1986)). The court further noted that the gradual
evolution of the use of the waste doctrine to permit actions by lenders against borrowers "is
supported by the same rationale that originally
supported the doctrine: it corrects incentives on
the part of a mortgagor who anticipates default
to deplete the collateral as much as possible before defaulting. Such an incentive leads to the
inefficient use of property. Expansion of the
doctrine of waste to mortgagor/mortgagee relationships removes this incentive." Id. at 120.
These statements alone do not resolve the question of how to treat the nonrecourse borrower,
however, for in the nonrecourse loan the court
confronts the additional fact that the lender has
voluntarily relinquished one of its most important remedies.
Thus, there actually are two aspects to recourse, one of them financial and the other one
psychological, and the typical nonrecourse
lender probably wishes to relinquish only the
first of these. This lender is willing, for consideration, to give up its right to a deficiency judgment from the borrower. But this same lender
probably is not willing to accept the possibility
that its now-shielded borrower will lose interest
in the property and will let it deteriorate, or will
rescue whatever it can for itself, once the borrower concludes that its equity contribution is
lost. What the nonrecourse lender would like to
do, if it can think of a way to do so, is to fashion
a nonrecourse loan that the borrower does not
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learn is nonrecourse until after the gavel comes
down at the forecosure sale. It is the lost motivation of the nonrecourse borrower that the test
proposed below attempts to recreate.
A Test to Determine When the Lender
May Look Beyond the Mortgaged Property
The test can be stated in its simplest form as
follows:
The lender may recoverfrom the borrower to the extent that the lendershows it suffered losses caused by
actions that the borrower would not have taken had
the borrower beenfully liable.
This statement does not mean that the lender
always may recover-if it meant that, the test
would convert every nonrecourse loan back
into a full recourse loan. Rather, the test means
that the lender may recover only to the extent
that it can prove that this borrower, shielded behind the nonrecourse provisions, acted in a way
that differs from the way that it would have
acted had it been fully exposed to liability, and
thereby caused loss to the lender. See Nippon
Credit Bank, Ltd. v. 1333 North Califomia Boulevard, 2001 WL 51611, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(adopting this test). If the nonrecourse lender
cannot show that the borrower would have behaved any differently had it feared personal
loss, the borrower should not be held financially accountable.
Test Operatesin Absence of More
Specific ContractualProvisions
This test attempts to create a reasonable default position for limited recourse loans that
lack a specific statement clarifying the scope of
the borrower's liability. Nonrecourse borrowers
will not routinely be held liable, as that would
undercut the financial expectations of many
nonrecourse borrowers and would give a financial windfall to lenders who already have been
compensated once for their relinquishment of a
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specific financial remedy. A court that wished to
find borrowers liable habitually would, in effect, be adopting a definition of waste that is
broad enough to negate the nonrecourse provisions of the loan documents. A more balanced
approach is desirable, given that the parties intended for this language to have some meaning,
however poorly they drafted it. The fact that a
nonrecourse loan is riskier to the lender should
not, by itself, make the court any more inclined
to rule in the lender's favor.
The BorrowerShould Treat the Lender's
InterestAs Though It Were Its Own
At the same time, nonrecourse borrowers
have a special responsibility to protect an asset
of theirs that they have pledged to another as
the sole security for repayment of a debt. A borrower that wishes to receive the numerous benefits of a nonrecourse loan has the concomitant
obligation to treat its lender's concerns with the
same degree of seriousness with which it would
treat its own. Any nonrecourse borrower that
acts just as it would have acted had it been fully
liable should not be held responsible for its
lender's losses.
Three Corollaries to the Test
Three corollaries follow from this bare statement of the test:
* The nonrecourse lender implicitly agrees to
defer to the borrower's professional judgment
and generally bears the risk of poor business decisions by the borrower;
* Because nonrecourse loans are loans in which
the borrower's losses are capped, the nonrecourse lender suffers those losses that were inevitable no matter how the borrower acted; and
9 The lender carries the burden of proof.
Each of these corollaries is explored below.
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Lender Defers to Borrower's Judgment
Every lender, whether or not it retains personal recourse against its borrower, knows that
it places a large part of its economic fate in the
hands of a borrower entity that will have to
make numerous business decisions every day.
Lenders defer to their real estate borrowers in
matters of real property management, because
lenders are primarily in the business of evaluating requests for credit and monitoring the loans
that result while borrowers possess expertise in
operating real estate. Lenders also may fear adverse consequences under tort and environmental laws if they assume too great a role in
day-to-day management. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§9607(a)(1) (imposing liability for certain environmental cleanup costs on "owner[s] and operator[s] of a.. .facility"); 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(E)(F) (defining "owner or operator").
The lender that agrees to a loan not only has
agreed that the mortgaged property constitutes
acceptable collateral but also has decided that
the borrower's property management skills are
satisfactory. In return for receiving funds, the
borrower pledges to the lender a significant
asset over which the borrower ordinarily retains
nearly complete management control.
This issue of control is unusually important
in nonrecourse loans, because the property is
the sole source of repayment of the debt. The
lender that has agreed not to look to the borrower will care far more about the fate of the
property than it otherwise would. Once the
nonrecourse borrower begins to believe that it is
likely to lose the property, however, its time
horizon becomes shorter than that of the lender,
and it may react to a critical financial emergency
by simply reconciling itself to losing its prior financial investment. If the borrower perceives
that there is no opportunity to gain and nothing
further to be lost, it may take advantage of this
absence of any further financial stake by neglecting or even milking the property. In short,
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management control over this important asset
rests with a borrower that may become disinterested in or hostile toward the property just as
the property's importance to the lender peaks.
Express Constraintson
the Borrower'sDiscretion
The nonrecourse lender should anticipate
that the borrower's interests could diverge from
its own and should demand loan covenants that
constrain the borrower's management discretion. Lenders that wish to include detailed standards of operation in the documents are as capable of doing so as are sophisticated commercial tenants. Failure by the borrower to meet
these detailed standards would trigger an early
default that will notify the attentive lender of
problems while the borrower still has some equity in the property and will afford the lender
the timely opportunity to take advantage of a
wide array of pre-foreclosure remedies.
The lender also must remember to insist on
partial recourse or some other type of financial
assurance that these loan covenants will not be
breached. See, e.g., Joshua Stein, Lender's Model
State-of-the-Art Nonrecourse Clause (with Carveouts), 43 The Practical Lawyer 31, 40-54 (Oct.
1997) (offering detailed form nonrecourse
clause, along with shorter alternative form);
Joshua Stein, Nonrecourse Carveouts: How Far is
FarEnough?, Real Est. Rev., Summer 1997, 3, 6-9
(listing items for which lenders might demand
carveouts from nonrecourse treatment and other
items for which lenders ordinarily would not
demand carveouts); John G. Wharton, Negotiating Carveouts to Non-Recourse Loan Documents,
13 The Practical Real Estate Lawyer 47 (Nov.
1997) (discussing this issue and offering form
language). The nonrecourse lender that remembers to include a covenant requiring the borrower to perform a given obligation but forgets to
provide for personal liability for failure to meet
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that obligation may find itself unable to recover
personally for the borrower's failure to perform.
The nonrecourse borrower pressed to make
these management concessions may respond
that if restraints on its flexibility force it to spend
more of its own money or time on the property
after trouble strikes than it otherwise would
have, then the lender is importing a type of indirect, limited recourse. The assets that a nonrecourse borrower may wish to protect from the
lender are not limited just to funds. Those assets
also include the borrower's time and attention.
If the borrower is subject to personal liability, it
may spend more of its own time on the project,
thereby transforming an otherwise unreachable
personal asset-its labor-into a reachable real
asset-the increase in the value of the property
that is attributable to that labor. To the extent
that a mortgage loan possesses some of the attributes of a personal services contract by the
borrower, it would not be unreasonable for the
nonrecourse lender to demand performance
standards for those services, with some recourse
available for failure to meet those standards.
In fact, the lender is trying to retain some limited amount of recourse. For if real world nonrecourse loans truly are limited recourse loans,
the parties need to establish at the outset just
how limited that recourse is or else risk suffering the consequences of this ambiguity later. By
specifying exactly what obligations the borrower has toward the property, with effective remedies available for breach of these obligations,
the documents are constraining the borrower's
discretion and shifting some management control back to the lender. The parties are agreeing
on exactly how limited the borrower's recourse
is and, in effect, are defining the mortgaged
property with precision. It also is possible for
the borrower to agree in advance how it will respond after default. For example, the parties
might determine that the loan will become non-
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recourse if the borrower cooperates during the
foreclosure process.
The borrower may decide to take a much different approach, arguing that the lender's relinquishment of a powerful remedy constitutes
tacit permission for the borrower to act more aggressively than it otherwise would. If this is
what the parties intended, as it might be in some
cases, then they should clarify the point in their
documents. The nonrecourse borrower that desires more operational freedom than it usually
has, like the nonrecourse lender that wants
stricter constraints than it ordinarily demands,
must raise the issue during the negotiations.
The bare presence of the term "nonrecourse,"
with nothing more, should not be interpreted as
sanctioning rash behavior. The default rule proposed here represents an intermediate and balanced starting point, one that reminds both parties that they must specify any departures from
it before the documents are signed.
Describe the Borrower's ObligationsPrecisely
The parties to nonrecourse loans should take
great care to describe the borrower's obligations
with precision. If they fail to do so, then courts
should be wary of holding the borrower liable
in cases in which the borrower's unfortunate
but nonmalevolent actions devalue the real estate. There is little justification for further penalizing the borrower who proves to be nothing
worse than foolhardy, incompetent, or unlucky,
particularly when that borrower possessed the
initial foresight to insist on a nonrecourse loan
and its lender failed to take the precaution of
limiting the borrower's flexibility. The nonrecourse lender should suffer the consequences of
its original poor decision to place its financial
fate so extensively in the hands of a borrower
for which things went badly This is not the type
of borrower that treats a nonrecourse loan as a
license to act differently than it otherwise would
have and is not the type of borrower that this ar-
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tide's proposals are designed to constrain. If the
court second-guesses every business decision
that the borrower makes and holds the borrower personally liable for every ill-considered or
unfortunate choice that turns out to have devalued the property, then the court inappropriately begins to convert the loan back into a full recourse loan.
Some Lender Losses May Be Inevitable
Every decision not to spend money to replace
a cracked window promptly is, in some sense, a
decision that hastens the conversion of realty into personalty. The nonrecourse borrower opts to
preserve its personal assets, which the lender
cannot reach, rather than restoring the value of
the real property, which might ultimately inure
to the benefit of the foreclosing lender. This inaction devalues the property physically, in the
sense that a slightly damaged building is worth
less than an unblemished one, and it devalues
the property financially, as business invitees become less willing to patronize establishments at
the property and tenants become less willing to
pay their rent or renew their leases. Such a decision may be seen as one in which the borrower
commits passive waste by failing to transform
personalty into realty in a setting in which such
a transformation ordinarily would be expected.
The fact that the loan is nonrecourse, however, means that the parties have expressly or implicitly agreed that the borrower's obligation to
spend money is capped at some finite amount
-perhaps the amount of cash originally contributed by the partners plus all income generated by the building. This liability ceiling is a
chief reason why borrowers request nonrecourse loans. If the amount that the nonrecourse
borrower committed to spend is insufficient to
meet all the needs of the property, then the borrower need not commit additional funds and
some obligations will not be met. Thus, the description of the cracked window disregards the
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fact that the borrower may have been performing triage in a situation in which some lender
loss was inevitable.
This "lockbox" approach seems to offer a reasonable estimate of the maximum financial obligation of the typical nonrecourse borrower, although this estimate raises ambiguities of its
own. Compare Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third
Assocs., 14 F3d 114, 123 n.9 (2d Cir. 1994) (observing that "the fact that the taxes had to be
paid from [subsequent] rental income suggests
that the distribution of the Partnership's accumulated cash assets and the Partnership's subsequent failure to pay taxes decreased the value
of the Property") with id. at 128 (Mishler, J., dissenting) (arguing that damages for waste
should be reduced "to the extent that rental income for the [subsequent] period is available for
payment of taxes"). Even if a project has not
been self-sustaining so far, it might become so in
the future, and the judges in Travelers seem to
disagree over how far into the future the court
ought to look to balance the books. This uncertainty highlights once again the importance of
detailing in the documents just what the borrower's obligations are and how much money
and time it is agreeing in advance that it must
spend. The loan documents, and perhaps the
borrower's governing documents, should address such questions as whether and when the
partners of the borrower are entitled to receive
distributions, whether they ever are obligated to
contribute additional funds, which capital improvements the borrower must undertake and
when, and whether the borrower must maintain a reserve fund.
If the borrower, in spending all the funds it
was required to spend, opted for an electrician
rather than a glazier, the court must begin with
the assumption that the borrower believed the
funds spent on the electrician would benefit the
property at least as much as the funds spent on
the window repair would have. The borrower
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faced an unenviable decision as to which of two
different types of deterioration to suffer, and the
court should not penalize it for choosing the one
it thought would cause the lesser harm to the
property. Both parties benefit if the party
charged with maintaining the property, and
most familiar with it, uses all of its available but
limited funds in the way it believes most beneficial to the property. If the borrower is held liable for a negative result that it attempted to
minimize and that may have been inevitable no
matter which repair it elected to make, then the
borrower is paying for the fact that the property
cannot support itself. Nonrecourse provisions
are supposed to shield borrowers from these
kinds of losses. Even if the failure to repair the
window is seen as passive waste, the borrower
that already has spent all it is required to spend
will have committed a tort without damages.
The distressed borrower's decision whether
to pay principal and interest can be a tricky one.
The borrower may reason that if its resources
are inadequate, it ought to meet all its other
commitments first, as its principal and interest
burden is the one obligation for which it is not
personally liable. However, nonpayment of
principal and interest telegraphs the borrower's
distress to the lender, and the borrower might
choose instead to mask its predicament by
meeting its principal and interest obligation and
deferring other commitments, the breach of
which may be less obvious. The lender that later
discovers such behavior might argue that, by
neglecting its obligations in this less transparent
way, the borrower has been passively liquidating the security and using the proceeds to meet
monthly loan obligations. If the cash available
to the nonrecourse borrower was insufficient,
then the overall monthly shortfall will be the
same size as it otherwise would have been, but
more months will have passed before the lender
was alerted to the problem. This stalling mechanism, the lender will argue, constitutes waste,
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with the lender suffering damages equal to the
amount by which its total losses increased after
it otherwise would have learned of the problem
and could have taken remedial action. If the
lender can prove that its nonrecourse borrower
acted in this way because of its insulation from
liability, the test proposed here would allow the
lender to recover. This point is particularly evident, and the calculation of damages unusually
easy, when the deterioration consists of a financial loss, such as a failure to pay real estate taxes,
rather than a physical loss.
On the other hand, the borrower need not always spend all available funds. For example,
maintaining a reserve fund may represent good
business practice, particularly if current demands, while significant, are not emergencies.
For a good analysis of the types of expenses that
a nonrecourse lender to a single-asset real estate
borrower is deemed to have approved in advance, in the context of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, see In re Willowood E.Apartments
of IndianapolisII, Ltd., 114 B.R. 138,143-44 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1990).
The Lender Carries the Burden of Proof
The lender always has the burden of proof in
an action for a deficiency judgment. This burden is fairly light for the typical full recourse
mortgagee, and the lender ordinarily can prove
what it needs to by introducing easily obtained
documents such as the note, canceled checks,
and receipts. The burden is far heavier when a
nonrecourse mortgage is in dispute, with the
lender also having to demonstrate to the court
why it should hold the borrower liable in spite
of the presence of exculpatory language in the
loan documents. Under the test described here,
if the nonrecourse provisions are ambiguous,
then the nonrecourse lender must show that the
borrower acted in a way that it would not have
had it been personally liable, that the borrow-

er's actions were more than just the ordinary
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discretionary activities of a property owner to
which the lender is deemed to have consented,
and that the lender would have lost less had the
borrower acted in some other way The nonrecourse lender that cannot make all portions of
this difficult showing must lose.
In asking whether the nonrecourse borrower
acted differently than it otherwise would have
and whether those differences fall within the
borrower's permitted discretion, a court will
need to confront the question of whether the
nonrecourse borrower is under any obligation
to act reasonably. The borrower-lender relationship is unique in every commercial loan, involving documents that are tailored to a specific transaction and personal relationships between pairs of parties that sometimes act atypically Given the extent to which the provisions
of commercial loans are negotiated, particularly
the nonrecourse provisions of loans in which
the borrower had the forethought to seek exculpation, it would be improper for a court to intervene and to assume that a particular borrower involved in a distinct transaction should be
held to some generic standard. No borrower in
such a sophisticated transaction should be presumed to be a "reasonable" borrower, and the
nonrecourse lender should be required to prove
that this borrower acted differently than it, and
not some hypothetical median borrower, would
have acted had it been personally liable.
At the same time, no borrower should be given license to act in any way it chooses, shielded
from liability by its knowledge of how difficult
it will be for its lender to prove that it acted differently than it, rather than the typical borrower, would have acted had the loan allowed for
full recourse. Instead of rejecting the reasonable
borrower standard completely, then, courts
should recognize that a wide spectrum of behavior is acceptable within these individualized
relationships, while also acknowledging that
behavior demonstrably outside of the range
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that the lender ought to have anticipated should
lead to liability.
A prudent lender will undertake a high level
of due diligence review and will investigate its
borrower's past transactions carefully. A borrower's performance in prior transactions
should be highly probative of the type of behavior the parties are agreeing to accept as permissible in the current one. If the lender wants
to constrain the borrower's actions any further,
it must include these additional constraints in
the documents. This difficulty in inferring performance standards demonstrates again why it
is so important for the lender to include detailed
guidelines in the loan documents, with personal recourse available after a breach. If the lender
fails to insist on management and operation
standards beforehand, the court should be reluctant to import them later.
Unless the borrower acts in a manner well beyond the range of expected behavior, the lender
that attempts to construct a case is likely to have
to rely on prior real estate activities by this borrower or by its principals. It may have to show
the court how the managing partners of the borrower reacted to financial difficulties in earlier
projects for which they were personally liable
and how they succeeded in overcoming similar
problems in the past. These will be difficult
showings and may require the lender to undertake a detailed and complex examination of the
borrower's books, as well as the books of other
entities in which the borrower's key management personnel have been involved.
The general partner of the borrower, for example, may have earned a reputation for making large cash distributions to its partners at
every opportunity and then operating the business with the thinnest of cash cushions. This
manager may be willing to take the risk of a
cash shortage that leads to default, forelosure,
a deficiency, and personal liability, even in a full
recourse loan. The partner might act in this risk-
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The test proposed here
requires only that the
borrower treat the lender's
interest as it would treat its
own. It does not, however,
demand that the borrower
treat its own interest with
any particular degree
of prudence.
preferring way because of its experience of usually coming out ahead, with frequent successes
outweighing occasional failures. If a lender,
after conducting its due diligence review, lends
to this borrower on a nonrecourse basis and
without constraining the borrower's discretion
over distributions, it does so with full awareness of the risks that this particular borrower
presents. Even if most borrowers might act
more conservatively, this specific borrower
should not be treated as operating beyond the
range of its permitted discretion if it behaves
this time just as the lender knew it had behaved
in the past. Only conduct that is egregious
under the standard appropriate for this unusually aggressive borrower should lead to borrower liability.
When the borrower's past behavior does not
so plainly reveal how the lender might have expected the borrower to act in the future, the
court's only option may be to extrapolate based
on the borrower's more generalized past activities. This option is unlikely to prove fruitful for
most nonrecourse lenders. In the typical case, a
court is likely to recognize a wide range of borrower behavior as acceptable under the circumstances, as it should. If the current project was
initially successful, however, the court needs
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only to observe how the borrower acted in the
early days of the loan, when the project was
thriving. At that point, the nonrecourse borrower had something of significant value to lose
and probably performed much like a full recourse borrower would have performed.
Note that the approach recommended here
differs from the prudent person standard familiar to trust lawyers. See, e.g., N.Y Est. Powers &
Trusts Law §11-2.3(b) (McKinney Supp. 2001)
(describing elements of prudent investor standard under Uniform Prudent Investor Act). A
commercial borrower is not a fiduciary for its
lender and, like other business persons, is free to
act in ways that a fiduciary never could. Prudent trustees shy away from speculative real estate investments due both to personal prudence
and fear of liability. Commercial borrowers, in
contrast, are entrepreneurs, and often are imprudent even with their own money The test
proposed here requires only that the borrower
treat the lender's interest as it would treat its
own. It does not, however, demand that the borrower treat its own interest with any particular
degree of prudence.
Some borrowers may be particularly rash
even when their own money is at risk.The lender that extends credit to these borrowers on a
nonrecourse basis should constrain their actions
in the loan documents. The test proposed here
does limit the behavior of these borrowers to
some extent by demanding that they adhere to
a weak version of the reasonable person test,
but the most reckless borrowers are the ones
that will be the least constrained by this limitation. A more significant check on the behavior of
these borrowers arises from the fact that lenders
that commence waste actions are bringing tort
claims and not contract claims. This means that
the court can award punitive damages to the
lender in extreme cases. See, e.g., Nippon Credit
Bank, Ltd. v. 1333 North CaliforniaBoulevard, 2001
WL 51611, at *10-12 (Ct. App. 2001)(recognizing
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that punitive damages may be awarded for
torts such as waste); Manson v. Reed, 231 Cal.
Rptr. 446, 453 (Ct. App. 1986) (awarding punitive damages in case in which borrower committed fraud). The threat of punitive damages,
if they are likely enough and sizable enough,
should deter borrowers from engaging in reckless or intentionally malicious behavior. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1998) (examining deterrent effect of punitive damages).
The lender's burden does not end when it
convinces the court that the borrower acted differently than it would have if it had been personally liable and that these differences went
beyond the owner's authorized level of discretion. The lender also must prove that this behavior caused actual loss. The previous section
offered a simple example in which the distressed borrower was forced to choose between
repairing a broken window and fixing faulty
wiring, but the facts facing actual owners will
be more jumbled, the losses more gradual, and
the challenge of proving those losses more difficult to overcome. The distressed property
owner is unlikely to respond outrageously at
the first whiff of trouble or to abdicate and allow
the property to collapse overnight; more likely,
it will be forced to relax standards gradually. As
money becomes more scarce, the borrower likely will defer discretionary maintenance and cut
back on building services little by little and will
allow its reserve fund to stop growing and then
begin to shrink.
This management strategy may be designed
selfishly to begin the borrower-protective processes of transforming realty into personalty and
avoiding any unnecessary transformation of
personalty into realty. More likely, it will not be a
strategy at all, but a series of context-sensitive,
pragmatic decisions made over a protracted period of time. Each of these choices will have been
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formulated to conserve a slowly evaporating
bank account so that funds are available for the
inevitable expensive emergencies on which
money may need to be spent quickly.
More than at any prior time, the competent
manager of distressed property needs to make
difficult decisions and to conserve declining resources. Every such action by the distressed
borrower likely is motivated by a combination
of factors. These factors probably will change in
relative significance from month to month, and
only one of them will be the borrower's desire
to preserve or augment its personal assets.
Moreover, the self-defense component of the
borrower's motivation typically will be a fairly
minor consideration as the problems begin,
when the owner still has significant equity in
the property and probably believes that the misfortunes will not persist. It will be difficult for a
lender to show that a managing partner's decision to conserve funds has ceased to be primarily a wise business choice under tough conditions and has become primarily an inappropriate personal enrichment measure. It will be just
as difficult to prove the resulting damages.
Summary of the Proposed Test
Wise nonrecourse lenders always will indude provisions in their documents that specify management standards that their borrowers
must meet and future financial obligations that
they must undertake. These precautions help to
define the mortgaged property and to avoid
any uncertainties about the borrower's expected performance. Lenders are not always this
prescient, however. The proposed test will help
courts determine when to allow a nonrecourse
lender access to the personal assets of its borrower and the partners of its borrower, a test
that will permit some lenders to recover in spite
of their failure to include or clarify critical language in the documents. The proposed test attempts to recreate the motivation to preserve
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9 The lender suffered actual loss as a result of
these improper borrower actions.

This article recommends that
courts adopt an approach
that compares the way in
which the nonrecourse
borrower actually acted with
the way in which it would
have acted had it been
personally responsible for
performance of the mortgage
obligations, holding
nonrecourse borrowers liable
only for the results of
any differences.
the mortgaged property that full recourse borrowers always retain. Those lenders that can
make the necessary showing will benefit from a
test that recognizes that nonrecourse borrowers
may become complacent or aggressively selfish
once the loan becomes distressed. See Nippon
Credit Bank, Ltd. v. 1333 North California Boulevard, 2001 WL 51611, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(recognizing risk that nonrecourse borrower
might "milk" property).
A lender that hopes to recover under this test
faces an uphill battle. It will have to carry the
very heavy burden of showing that:
* The borrower acted in a way that differs from
the way it would have acted had it been personally liable;
* The borrower exceeded its significant business discretion; and

CONCLUSION * The common law has had
centuries to develop rules that apply to ordinary full recourse loans, but the courts are only
beginning to face the questions that arise when
parties voluntarily reject this body of law and
replace it with an ill-defined substitute of their
own creation. The most direct way for borrowers and lenders to avoid disputes is to define
their relationship precisely, a course that only
some parties follow. Others will agree to a document that waives a key remedy without clarifying what options remain to the lender. As several recent cases have shown, this second approach breeds unnecessary litigation.
Judges, who may be unfamiliar with the intricacies of real estate finance, need to recognize
several points before they can decide these cases
fairly. They must appreciate that a nonrecourse
loan differs from both full recourse and zero recourse loans. They must realize that a nonrecourse loan is one in which the lender must look
solely to the mortgaged property in far more
cases than it otherwise would, but not necessarily always. In addition, they must acknowledge
that the definition of the mortgaged property
may not be dear. The mortgaged property is an
asset with a legal characterization that can be
uncertain and with a value that fluctuates, and
the borrower has the capacity to transform
some of this secured property into unreachable
personal property.
Judges facing litigation about the scope of the
lender's recourse may find themselves wondering exactly what the parties agreed to and conduding that they did not agree to anything
helpful. Nonetheless, once a nonrecourse loan
goes into default, a court may find itself forced
to decide exactly how much protection the inadequate documents provide to the borrower.
In doing so, the court must recognize that the
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parties intended to protect the borrower financially to some degree but probably did not intend to let the borrower disregard the lender's
interests entirely. The court, then, must strive to
reach a result that preserves the borrower's motivation to protect the security but that limits the
losses facing the borrower that fails to do so.
This article recommends that courts adopt an
approach that compares the way in which the
nonrecourse borrower actually acted with the
way in which it would have acted had it been
personally responsible for performance of the
mortgage obligations, holding nonrecourse
borrowers liable only for the results of any differences. This standard insulates the borrower
from the market risks that the lender probably
expected to assume, but leaves the borrower liable for the costs of any actions that it took only
because it believed that it would not have to
pay for their consequences. This test should ensure that nonrecourse borrowers will not act
foolishly or recklessly, or at least not any more
so than they would if their own funds were at
risk. This approach also will help guide borrowers and lenders earlier in their relationship,
as they attempt to negotiate documents that are
mutually acceptable.
The test proposed here places a heavy burden
on the lender. The lender must prove that the
nonrecourse borrower behaved differently than
it otherwise would have, demonstrating along
the way that the borrower exceeded the scope
of the discretion that it retained as owner of the
property and that the lender suffered actual loss
as a result of the borrower's acts or omissions.
Most lenders will not be able to make this show-
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ing. This difficulty demonstrates the importance to the lender of addressing these issues in
advance, in the documents, rather than trying to
place limits on the borrower's behavior after a
project becomes troubled. Borrowers and lenders that wish to avoid participating in the slow
and costly development of the case law may do
so easily, by reflecting carefully on the repercussions of their proposed business arrangements
and then drafting their documents thoughtfully.
In one sense, the typical dispute discussed
above is little more than a private law disagreement between a borrower and a lender with an
unnecessarily vague business relationship. If
the parties end up litigating their differences, a
judge will have to interpret their imprecise documents. The consequences of these disagreements, however, can affect parties beyond the
borrower and the lender. Every time a borrower defaults, title to its property may become
clouded, the condition of the property may deteriorate, tenants may vacate the premises, and
the local community may endure hardship as a
result of the owner's distress and the lender's
inability to terminate it swiftly. Every time a
lender must write off a bad loan, its owners suffer; if this happens too often to the same lender,
others-such as the federal government and the
taxpayers that support it-may end up paying
the cost of the parties' errors. The rule proposed
here should allow judges to resolve these issues
fairly and in accordance with the probable expectations of the parties while also creating incentives for these and other parties to avoid
similar disputes and similar consequences in
the future.
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PRACTICE CHECKLIST FOR
When Can a Nonrecourse Lender Reach the Personal Assets of Its Borrower?
For real estate ventures, the limited partnership remains a favored entity. To protect themselves from
personal liability, general partners often are able to negotiate nonrecourse loans-the lender agrees
to look only to the collateral for satisfaction of the debt. Because the nonrecourse lender cannot reach
the borrower's personal assets, distinguishing the mortgaged property from the borrower's personal assets is far more important in the nonrecourse loan than in the full recourse loan.
Unfortunately, the legal definition of the mortgaged property may be unsettled at its edges, and borrowers possess the ability to shield assets from nonrecourse lenders by transforming real estate into
personal property.
* A nonrecourse loan actually is a loan with limited recourse. If the borrower, foreseeing a foreclosure, reduces or wastes the collateral, a court may impose personal liability.
ED To avoid confusion and litigation, the loan documents should spell out the scope of the borrower's duties with respect to the collateral.
l Loan documents do not always contain these provisions. When they do not, courts should adopt
a test that compares the way in which the nonrecourse borrower actually acted with the way in
which it would have acted had it been personally responsible for performance of the mortgage
obligations, holding nonrecourse borrowers liable only for the results of any differences. This standard insulates the borrower from the market risks that the lender probably expected to assume,
but leaves the borrower liable for the costs of any actions that it took only because it believed that
it would not have to pay for their consequences. This test should ensure that nonrecourse borrowers will not act foolishly or recklessly, or at least not any more so than they would if their own
funds were at risk. This approach also will help guide borrowers and lenders earlier in their relationship, as they attempt to negotiate documents that are mutually acceptable.
• To prevail under the proposed test, the lender would have to establish that:
F- The borrower acted in a way that differs from the way it would have acted had it been personally liable;
LI The borrower exceeded its significant business discretion; and
l The lender suffered actual loss as a result of these improper borrower actions.
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